AbstractCan we talk about ethics? Does moral language make sense at all? Is there such a thing as a moral fact? The early Wittgenstein unequivocally presumes a negative answer. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, ethics is ineffable, for it is ¡§impossible for there to be propositions of ethics¡¨ (6.42) and it is also clear that ¡§ethics cannot be put into words¡¨ (6.421); therefore, regarding ethics, we must pass it over in silence. It is all too easy to conclude the early Wittgenstein¡¦s view on ethics as noncognitivism. I believe that the later Wittgenstein, especially the Philosophical Investigations, offers us his different take on ethics. In this paper, I shall first briefly recap the trajectory of Wittgenstein¡¦s views on ethics, and then I shall defend a cognitivist interpretation of his approach to ethics. I argue that Wittgenstein¡¦s later ideas of language game and form of life could contribute to a cognitivist idea, even a constructivist idea of ethics.. |