AbstractIn this paper, I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein¡¦s remarks on aspect perception in the Investigations. I take Wittgenstein to mount a sustained attack on (what I will call) ¡§procedural¡¨ explanations of psychological phenomena. Such explanations are ¡§procedural¡¨ in trying to find what all instances of psychological processes have in common, and making reference to some internal mechanism that is causally responsible for the processes. Procedural explanations aim at uncovering the common denominator and cause of psychological processes and, in so doing, they aim at finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of psychological concepts.Wittgenstein thinks that such an approach is mistaken, because in order to understand the criteria for the application of a concept we should aim at a description of the use of the concept in language. I suggest that Wittgenstein¡¦s remarks have important consequences for the philosophy of psychology. I draw out such consequences and discuss them against the background of contemporary debate on the scope and form of psychological explanations. . |