Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I shall offer an interpretation of the solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition derivable from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Second, I shall suggest an alternative and more promising solution to the problem.

How is a proposition different from a mere collection of its constituents? How is the asserting force, so to speak, contained in the proposition? Satisfactory answers to these questions without falling into Bradley’s regress constitute a solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition. In this paper, I shall argue that, for the Tractatus, the existential quantifier, or, rather, NN (where N is the fundamental operation introduced in TLP 5.5), binds several names together in accordance with a specific logical form, or a logico-combinatorial possibility, to constitute an elementary proposition asserting the existence of a state of affairs. The existential quantifier in an elementary proposition therefore does not bind propositions together, but belongs to the signifying relation holding between names and objects. In other words, one builds up, for a propositional sign, an assertive logico-pictorial relation with the world via existential quantification. It is in this way that the unity of the proposition is guaranteed, and anything like Bradley’s regress would be barred from arising from the very beginning.

The Tractarian solution, however, does not seem to be applicable to the case of natural language and that of formal systems other than the Tractarian system. Nevertheless, in this paper, I shall also suggest a more promising solution to the problem, based on the Tractatus’ insight that the unity of the proposition is given by intrinsic existential quantification.