Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to offer a new perspective to look at the problem of rule-following notably discussed by Kripke (1982) and Wittgenstein (1953). I first suggest that ascriptions of rule-following be viewed as generic sentences, which express some kind of regularities or generalizations that nonetheless tolerate exceptions. I then seek to find a proper semantic analysis for such generically construed ascriptions. Truth-condition semantics are not favored in this approach, as not only in the area of generics, but also in the industry of rule-following, a wide variety of truth-functional solutions have not yet been decisively shown to be entirely satisfactory. Assertibility-condition semantics offered in the skeptical solution are adopted. I offer a cognitively oriented account inspired by Leslie's (2008) work on generics that differs from, and improves on, the highly inadequate communitarian version offered by Kripke. The resulting picture is compatible, as I shall further show, with a realist view of rule-following. The paper ends with a discussion of how my account respects some important insights from Wittgenstein himself, but in a more satisfying way.